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Introduction
The liberalization of European telecommunications markets can be regarded as a success at least with two respects. Former established incumbent fixedline operators face competition from various new providers which sequentially entered the markets. Moreover, several new technologies such as mobile and IP-based telephony have emerged which additionally challenge to competitive position of former incumbent operators. This created an asymmetric market environment in various dimensions. Typically, in Europe, incumbent fixed-line operators still enjoy a demand-side advantage over any entrant in terms of subscriber base, both in the fixed-line and the mobile telecommunications markets. However, due to the later entry, entrants may had the opportunity to set up more recent technologies which may imply a cost-side advantage of service on their side. Especially, with IP-based networks, marginal costs of providing electronic communications are virtually zero, which, e.g., has been stated by the German Monopolies Commission (Monopolkommission, 2006) .
Practitioners in regulatory authorities as well as academics have acknowl-
edged the important role of interconnection charges, also labeled as termination or access charges, at the wholesale level to imped competition and foster entry at the retail level. The question arises, whether asymmetries of operators require an asymmetric regulation of interconnection charges.
In the mobile telecommunications markets the European Commission (EU Commission 2009) proposes termination rates to be limited to the incremental costs of providing call termination, so called pure long-run incremental cost (pure LRIC). The costing model should reflect the fact that operators may have different cost structures, which can e.g. be linked to different technical conditions of their networks, e.g. spectrum licenses, can be a result of different economies of scale due to different market shares or due to the adoption of more efficient technologies. Such cost differences have rarely been considered in the theoretical literature on call termination, which serve as the starting point of the present analysis.
The German Bundesnetzagentur recently estimated lower termination costs for the later entrants in the mobile telecommunications market. For EPlus, one of two smaller competitors, it estimated termination costs of 2,67 ct/min, whereas it estimated higher costs from 3,33-3,37 ct/min for the other operators. In February 2011, the Bundesnetzagentur has announced mobile termination rates (MTRs) for all operators for the years 2010-2012 between 3.36-3.39 ct/min. 1 Thus, it sets a markup on the cost of one of the smaller network E-Plus, whereas it adopts LRIC-regulation for all other operators.
This access markup on termination costs of the low cost network serves as a starting point of the present analysis. In a model with a demand-side asymmetry (and cost-side symmetry) between telecommunications providers, Peitz (2005a) shows that such an entrant's access markup indeed benefits entrants and, given entry, competition is more intense. In an accompanying paper (Peitz (2005b) ) he further shows that this also holds if providers discriminate between prices for calls terminated on-net and off-net. The present model can generalize his results and show that this conclusion is sensitive to a symmetry of termination costs. By considering asymmetric termination costs it will be shown the an entrant's access markup can even be to the detriment of its profit and in turn, can reduce entry into the market. This result is due to a cost-saving effect for the incumbent. If termination costs are sufficiently asymmetric, the high cost incumbent has an incentive to terminate calls in the low cost network (off-net) and thereby attract rival customers. This (positive or negative) effect of regulation on providers' market share is new and basically determines the effect of regulation on providers' profits.
If asymmetries in the demand-and supply-side are large it can be shown that both providers prefer cost-based regulation of termination charges.
The second part of the analysis covers another widely proposed regulatory regime. The British Ofcom recently announed a glide path of MTRs based on a maximum average rate calculated using the pure LRIC of providing call termination for their major operators from 4,18 pence per minute in 2011, moving towards 0,69 pence per minute in 2015. 2 Consequently, the cost of calling to mobile networks are set on a reciprocal basis and will steadily decrease. In line with Wright (1999, 2003 ) the second part of the paper deals with a reciprocal regulation and the sequential reduction of termination rates, given cost asymmetries between networks. In a model of pure demand-side asymmetry Wright (1999, 2003) show that a marginal reduction of a reciprocal termination charge leaves providers' market shares and profits unaffected. It will be shown that this no longer holds with asymmetric termination costs and both providers may benefit or suffer from a reduction of the reciprocal termination charge. It will be shown that if asymmetries in demand and supply are large, both providers prefer cost-based regulation of termination charges to the incumbent's costs.
Asymmetries in termination costs have also been addressed by Kocsis (2007) who focuses on a supply-side asymmetry with a linear demand for calls. Hoernig (2009) calibrates a model of competition between an arbitrary number of telecommunications networks in the presence of tariff-mediated network externalities, call externalities, and cost and surplus asymmetries. Harbord and Hoernig (2010) run simulations based on the model of Hoernig (2009) to show that a "bill-and-keep" regime increases social welfare, consumer surplus, and networks' profits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the base model. Section 3 allows for an access markup for the low cost network and analyzes the regimes of nondiscriminatory pricing and price discrimination between on-net and off-net calls. Similarly, section 4 discusses the effect of reciprocity of termination charges for both networks. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
Consider competition between an established provider (firm 1) and an entrant (firm 2) which are located at the opposite ends of a Hotelling-line. The base model follows the seminal model of Laffont et al. (1998) . It assumes that both networks are interconnected and provide full local coverage.
For calls from to the rival's networks ("off-net") providers have to pay a termination charge of a j . They incur a marginal cost c i per minute for originating and terminating a call, so total marginal costs of a call are assumed to be 2c i , where the model abstracts from any additional costs, e.g. transmission costs. Specifically, we assume that c 2 < c 1 , i.e. the entrant operates at lower termination cost which e.g. may be due to a more recent technology. 3 3 In practise, there is a discussion whether later entrants face lower or higher costs of 4 To mirror current market structures in many European countries it is assumed that the incumbent still captures a larger installed subscriber base than the entrant. To model the demand-side asymmetry the present model follows the framework of Carter and Wright (2003) . The utility derived by a consumer for subscribing to either network i is given as
where q(p i ) is the number of calls placed on network i, depending on the per-minute price p i . υ 0 represents a fixed surplus ("option value") from being connected to either network and is assumed sufficiently large so that all subscribers choose to be connected to a network. Subscribers receive a network specific benefit of subscribing to network i of
and
Customers are endowed with a value of x drawn from a uniform distribution on the [0, 1] interval, with the networks 1 and 2 located at either end of the interval. The parameter σ expresses the degree of substitution between both providers. Hence, σ can be interpreted to reflect the degree of competition in the market, with higher values corresponding to more intense competition.
As in the models of Wright (1999, 2003) Given that all consumers' marginal willingness to pay for calls is the same termination than established incumbents. Due to the sequential allocation of frequencies in mobile telecommunications entrants in Germany sometimes claim to face higher coverage costs to cover the territory or to insure indoor coverage of its 1800 Mhz band compared to the 900/1800 Mhz band of T-Mobile and Vodafone. Otherwise, it may be stressed that the fact that a frequency band is only suitable for a more expensive technology should be compensated by a lower market price for this license.
and known, networks can do no better than offering two-part tariffs. Each network charges a per-minute price p i and a fixed fee F i . Therefore, the two-part tariff is given as
The function
denotes the indirect utility derived from making calls at a price p, so υ (q) ≡ −q(p) gives the associated demand function. For example, a linear demand
Subscribers are assumed to be identical in terms of their demand for calls to other subscribers.
Solving for the indifferent consumer with U 1 = U 2 , the market share of the incumbent is
and s 2 = 1 − s 1 for the entrant.
Asymmetric Regulation
In the following we analyze to regulatory regimes.
In the first part we analyze the impact of an entrant's access markup on cost, in the second part we analyze the impact of an incumbent's access deficit below cost. In either regulatory regime, we analyze the pricing strategies of non-discriminatory pricing and price-discrimination between on-net and off-net prices.
Non-discriminatory pricing
In the following analysis the entrant may charge a termination fee above marginal costs, i.e. a 2 > c 2 , whereas the incumbent is regulated at costs,
i.e. a 1 = c 1 . 4 Since market shares s i are directly determined by the net surplus ω i , it is more convenient to consider networks to compete over p i and ω i rather than in p i and F i . Substituting
function of provider i is denoted as
The first two parts denote the profits in the retail market due to per-minute prices and fixed fees. Calling patterns are assumed to be balanced, with a share of s i s j requiring interconnection. 5 The third part represents the profit in the interconnection market. Provider i charges a termination rate of a i , but incurs costs of c i for rival subscribers' calls terminated in its network.
Otherwise, for off-net calls by fellow subscribers the provider has to pay a termination charge of a j but saves the termination costs.
Equilibrium prices correspond to "the perceived marginal costs" of a call of
which is the standard result in the symmetric setup of Laffont et al. (1998) and asymmetric setups of Carter and Wright (2003) , Peitz (2005a) , and Valletti and Cambini (2005) . By setting per-minute prices equal to the perceived marginal costs the networks can extract consumers' surplus by the fixed fee. The providers incur costs of 2c i for originating and terminating calls on-net but save costs of s j c i for calls terminated off-net.
Rearranging F i = υ(p i ) − ω i , the fixed fee at the equilibrium per-minute price is given as
Each provider sets its per-minute price equal to the perceived marginal cost and, thus, makes no profit from the amount of off-net and on-net traffic by fellow subscribers. The only source of income stems from subscription and incoming calls from rival subscribers. Accordingly, each operator makes a profit in terms of net surplus of
Subscribers' Net Surplus
According to equation (4) an entrant's access markup directly increases the incumbent's per-minute prices for given market shares. The total effect on subscribers' surplus is ambiguous, though, and depends on the extent of the asymmetries in the market.
Proposition 1. For symmetric termination costs subscribers of both networks benefit from a marginal increase of the entrant's termination charge.
For asymmetric termination costs net utilities may increase or decrease.
Subscribers of both networks will likely benefit if providers are not too differentiated and termination costs are not too asymmetric. The intuition is as follows. Consider the incumbent operator. As already stated by Peitz (2005a) due to the larger termination charge is has to pay, it has an incentive to decrease the number of calls to the entrant in order to keep its perceived marginal costs low. The number is maximal for an 8 equal split of the market, hence, the incumbent has an incentive to increase its subscribers' net surplus to increase its market share. However, to the contrary, it also has an incentive to increase the number calls to the rival's network. This is due to a cost-saving effect. The incumbent could save its higher costs by terminating calls in the entrant's network and thus, also has an incentive to increase the number of calls to the entrant's network.
The entrant has countervailing incentives as well. Clearly, on the one hand, the entrant has an incentive to increase the number of incoming calls to obtain higher revenues from incoming calls given rival's demand for calls and therefore offers a higher net surplus to its consumers. However, slightly reducing the net surplus reduces the amount of incoming calls and thereby, reduces the rival's cost-saving effect and increases rival's per-minute price.
In turn, the net utility from calling on the incumbent's side decreases as well, competition on net surplus becomes less intense and the entrant may capture the remaining net surplus via the fixed fee.
Market Shares
The expression for equilibrium market shares are relegated to the appendix.
Based on the previous effect on subscribers, we are interested in the effect of an entrant's access markup on provider's market shares. In his model of demand-side asymmetry and supply-side symmetry Peitz (2005a) concluded a neutral effect of an entrant's access markup on market shares locally around cost-based regulation. Total differentiation of the entrant's market share (locally around cost-based regulation of a i = c i ) yields:
and of
| a i =c i for the incumbent. Hence, there is a local effect on market shares for any asymmetry in termination costs (c 1 = c 2 ). Given that c 2 < c 1 the numerator is positive, as q < 0. The sign of
is thus determined by the sign of the denominator. Otherwise, for a supply-side symmetry, the neutrality result by Peitz (2005a) is confirmed.
Proposition 2. For symmetric termination costs an entrant's access markup has no local effect on market shares. For asymmetric termination costs an entrant's access markup has a positive local effect on its market share if i) the degree of substitution between both networks is sufficiently low (i.e., σ is sufficiently large), ii) termination costs are sufficiently asymmetric, and iii) the demand for calls is sufficiently rigid.
Proof: See Appendix. and set A = b = 1. From evaluation of equation (7) at cost-based regulation it follows that there is a positive effect on the entrant's market share if
Given that providers are hardly differentiated, i.e., competition is intense, and given that termination costs are sufficiently asymmetric, an increase of the entrant's termination charge has a positive local effect on its market share. Otherwise, if competition is sufficiently soft, this may be reversed.
The intuition behind the result follows the one given in the previous section since market shares are directly determined by subscribers' net surplus and providers face countervailing incentives to increase or decrease subscribers' net surplus depending on the incumbent's cost saving for off-net call termination. If the entrant's termination costs are sufficiently low the incumbent has an incentive to decrease net surplus of it's subscribers and in turn, to decrease its market shares, in order to increase the number of off-net calls.
Profits
Since providers set per-minute prices equal to perceived marginal costs, the equilibrium profits are denoted by equation (6). Since regulation affects market shares, it affects both the retail market (the first part of equation (6)), and the interconnection market (the second part of the equation). Differentiation of the profit functions with respect to a 2 (locally around cost-based regulation of a i = c i ), yields
and Given symmetric termination costs of c 1 = c 2 it has been shown in equation (7) that there is no local effect on market shares, hence
Applying the neutrality of market shares simplifies the effect of a marginal increase of the entrant's termination charge on providers' profits denoted as
This confirms the non-neutrality result on profits obtained by Peitz (2005a) in a model of demand-side asymmetry and by Kocsis (2007) 
Entrant's profit
Decompose the effects on profits in the retail and in the interconnection market and assume the entrant captures market shares from the incumbent, i.e. (q(p * j )), and iii) the total amount of off-net calls (s * i s * j ). Obviously, a termination markup increases the per-minute profit per rival subscriber unit.
Calling patterns are assumed to be balanced. Starting from the asymmetric situation of s 2 < s 1 , an increase in s 2 increases the number of off-net calls, which is maximized at s 1 = s 2 . Both effects benefit the entrant. Total interconnection profit is determined by
Hence, it is further necessary to determine the impact on rival subscriber's demand, given as
, with q < 0. It holds that
Thus the effect on rival subscribers' demand is ad hoc unclear. If the difference in termination costs is large the incumbent has an incentive to push the demand for off-net calls to save its termination costs and thereby, to decrease its per-minute price. Otherwise, if the entrant's subscriber base is too large, an entrant's access markup may be to the detriment of its termination profit. This is due to providers' perceived marginal costs. If the entrant's subscriber base is sufficiently large, there are many off-net calls. Now, an increase in a 2 has a larger impact on rival's per-minute prices for a larger entrant's market share. Given the difference in termination costs, the incumbent increases its per-minute prices for a larger entrant's market share, reducing the demand of the incumbent's subscribers which may overturn the cost-saving effect.
Consider the retail market. It follows from equation (6) that the effect of a termination markup on the entrant's retail profit is determined by market shares and the fixed fee, determined by subscribers' net surplus as
Assume again that the entrant's market share is increasing in a 2 .
Locally evaluating the derivative of the fixed fee with respect to the entrant's termination fee (around cost-based termination charges) yields
It has been stated above that for symmetric termination costs subscribers' net surplus increases in an entrant's access markup. Hence, since market share are locally unaffected for c i = c j , fixed fees decrease, leading to lower profits in the retail market. Otherwise, for asymmetric termination costs, the fixed fee may increase or decrease. The effects in the retail and interconnection market may be countervailing, leading to a non-monotone relationship between the termination charge and profits. This will be illustrated in example 2.
Incumbent's profit
Consider the effect of an entrant's access markup on the incumbent's profit.
Notably, as per-minute prices are set equal to perceived marginal cost, an increase of a 2 does not affect the interconnection profit of equation (6) locally around a 1 = c 1 . So the local effect on total profit is given as
Remember that the incumbent provider may offer a higher net surplus to its subscribers in response to an increase in a 2 . In order to determine the effect on the fixed fee it is necessary to additionally determine the effect on the indirect utility from making calls, as F i = υ(p i ) − ω i . Given the indirect utility υ(p i ) the fixed fee is the lower the higher the net utility ω i . The effect on the indirect utility from making calls is affected by the per-minute price, which may increase or decrease in a 2 as
≶ 0. Now if competition is sufficiently soft, it follows that ds * 2 da 2 > 0, and the incumbent's per-minute price decreases. The incumbent saves the higher termination cost on its network for every call terminated in the entrant's network. For s 2 < s 1 an increase in the entrant's market share increases the number of off-net calls, which is maximized at s 2 = s 1 . Now, the perceived marginal cost is the lower the higher the entrant's market share, and thus, the incumbent may benefit even if it gives up market shares to the entrant, due to a cost-saving effect. This positive effect holds if the share of off-net calls, determined by rival's market share is small, otherwise for large s 2 the total loss in market shares might become too large compared to the costsaving effect. Thus, the effects on profits crucially depend on the demandand supply-side asymmetry and on the degree of competition in the market. 
Price Discrimination
The following section allows providers to charge different prices for calls terminated on the subscriber's network ("on-net") and for those terminated on the rival's network ("off-net"). Denote provider i s on-net price as p i
and its off-net price asp i . If a provider's market share is s i , its subscribers 14 make a fraction s i of their calls on-net and the remaining 1 − s i calls off-net.
Then, subscribers' net surplus ω(p i ,p i ) is
With price discrimination is follows that providers set per-minute prices equal to the true marginal costs, i.e.
Without price discrimination, the first-order conditions with respect to call prices weights the optimal per-minute prices with price discrimination of equations (12) and (13) by their market shares, which gives equation (4).
Since termination costs differ for both providers, a uniform per-minute price is the average of marginal on-net and off-net costs, which reflects a weighted average of true marginal costs.
The equilibrium fixed fee is set to
Proposition 4. If providers can discriminate between on-net and off-net prices for calls all subscribers benefit from an entrant's access markup.
Proof: See Appendix.
Without price discrimination subscribers may benefit or suffer from a marginal increase of the entrant's termination charge, depending on extent of the costsaving effect. However, with price discrimination the per-minute prices are set to true marginal costs of on-net and off-net termination. Thus, there is no cost-saving opportunity and it directly follows that subscribers unambiguously benefit from an entrant's access markup. Due to the higher off-net costs, the incumbent has an incentive to reduce the number of off-net calls and due to the higher termination rate the entrant has an incentive to increase the number of off-net calls.
If providers are unable to discriminate between on-net and off-net prices, it has been shown that both providers' market shares are positively or negatively locally affected by a marginal increase in the entrant's termination charge a 2 above marginal costs. However, if providers can price discriminate it can be shown that market shares are locally unaffected, i.e. A termination markup generates income from inbound calls from rival subscribers for the entrant. Locally around cost-based regulation, the entrant benefits from a marginal increase in its termination charge. Otherwise, the incumbent has to pay a higher termination charge for outbound calls, and hence, it suffers from the increase. Technically,
and For reciprocal termination charges equilibrium per-minute-prices are set to
Subscribers' Net Surplus
Considering reciprocal termination fees it can be shown that subscribers may be again adversely affected by regulation. The technical proof goes along the line of section 3.1.1 and is relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 6. For symmetric termination costs a marginal reduction of the reciprocal termination charge has no local effect on subscribers' net utilities. Otherwise, for asymmetric termination costs, a reduction of the reciprocal termination charge below the incumbent's cost is unambiguously beneficial for incumbent's subscribers. Entrant's subscribers benefit if termination costs are not too asymmetric, otherwise, they are harmed.
Since (locally) the incumbent faces the same termination cost for on-net and off-net termination there is no cost-saving opportunity of off-net call termination any longer. The incumbent faces an access deficit, and thus, has an unambiguous incentive to reduce the number of off-net calls. As the number of off-net calls is determined by the market shares, the incumbent should increase the net utility to the subscribers in order to increase its market share and to reduce the number of off-net calls. The entrant still has countervailing incentives. On the one hand, since a = c 1 > c 2 , it benefits from interconnection of rival customers, and thus has an incentive to increase the amount of incoming calls by increasing the net utility for its customers.
On the other hand, it faces higher termination costs for off-net than for onnet calls, thus, it has an incentive to reduce the amount of off-net calls by decreasing the net utility for its customers. Hence, the effect on entrant's subscribers depends on the cost difference. If the entrant's termination costs are sufficiently low compared to the incumbent's cost, entrant's subscribers are harmed, otherwise, if costs become more symmetric they benefit.
Market Shares
The equilibrium market share equations are relegated to the Appendix. Total differentiation of the entrant's market share with respect to a locally around cost-based regulation of the incumbent network (a = c 1 ) yields that
Proposition 7. For symmetric termination costs a marginal reduction of the reciprocal termination charge has no local effect on market shares. Otherwise, for asymmetric termination costs, a marginal decrease of the reciprocal termination charge below the incumbent's cost increases the entrant's market share if i) providers are sufficiently differentiated, ii) the difference in termination costs is not too large, and iii) the entrant's market share is not too large.
The analysis shows that the "neutrality result" on market shares by Carter and Wright (2003) only holds for symmetric termination costs. Otherwise, there is a local effect of regulation on market shares, determined by the sign of the denominator, which is due to the previous effects on subscribers' net surplus.
Example 3: Consider a linear calling demand of q(p i ) = 1 − p i again. A reduction of the reciprocal termination charge increases the entrant's market shares, i.e.
This holds if the entrant's initial cost-advantage is sufficiently low, competition in the market is sufficiently soft, and the entrant's market share is sufficiently small. Consider from the per-minute price of the incumbent provider of p * 1 = 2c 1 + s * 2 (a − c 1 ) that a reciprocal termination charge of a < c 1 decreases the price and thus increases the indirect utility of calls υ(p * 1 ). Given a larger entrant's market share this effect is intensified and the entrant has to offset the increase of incumbent subscribers' net surplus in order not to lose market shares.
Profits
In a their model on asymmetric competition Carter and Wright (2003) concluded that for asymmetric market shares and symmetric termination costs a marginal reduction of the reciprocal termination charge does not affect providers' profits. This no longer holds for asymmetric termination costs.
From the previous section it follows that providers can both gain or lose market shares in response to a marginal reduction of the reciprocal termination charge below the incumbent's costs. Then, both providers' profits may be positively or negatively affected. The effect on providers' profit crucially depends on the degree of competition in the market and the demand-and supply-side asymmetry.
Proposition 8. For symmetric termination costs a marginal reduction of the reciprocal termination charge does not affect providers' profits. For asymmetric termination costs providers may gain or suffer. If competition is sufficiently soft a marginal reduction of the reciprocal termination charge is generally to the detriment of the incumbent and to the benefit of the entrant.
If competition is intense and the demand-side asymmetry is sufficiently large, the incumbent may benefit.
Entrant's profit
Consider the effects on the entrant's profit in both the interconnection and the retail market. Marginally decreasing the reciprocal termination charge induces countervailing effects in the interconnection market, where the termination charge affects i) the per-minute profit per rival subscriber (a − c 2 ), ii) the total off-net traffic by rival subscribers (q(p * 1 )), and iii) the amount of off-net traffic (s * 1 s * 2 ). The first effect is clearly negative. The second effect is positive. Marginally reducing the termination fee leads to a decrease in the incumbent's per-minute price, notably ∂p * 1 ∂a | a=c 1 = s * 2 > 0. From q < 0 it follows that off-net traffic per incumbent subscriber is increasing, which is to the entrant's benefit as long as a > c 2 . Total off-net traffic (s * 1 s * 2 q(p * 1 )) depends on the sign of the market shares effect. Given soft competition, the entrant captures market shares, and thus, the number of off-net traffic is increasing for any s 2 < s 1 . Hence, the total effect on interconnection profit may be ambiguous.
Consider the effects in the retail market. The effect on retail profit is determined by the fixed fee, given by
The effect on the fixed fee is determined by the indirect utility from making calls and the subscribers' net utility. Notice from section 4.1. that the incumbent provider offers a larger net surplus to its subscribers. This implies translates into a larger indirect utility from marking calls and, thus, to an opposing effect on the fixed fee. Finally, the total effect on profit is ambiguous again, which is illustrated in example 4 below.
Incumbent's profit
Consider the incumbent provider's profit. It will be shown in the Appendix that whenever its market share is decreasing, its total profit is decreasing.
In the interconnection market it faces a loss per rival subscriber. If the incumbent gives away market shares, total entrant's off-net traffic increases, leading to a larger loss from interconnection. Moreover, since 
Price Discrimination
Now consider providers price discriminate in on-net and off-net prices again.
It will be shown in the Appendix that independent of the opportunity to discrimination, incumbent subscribers will benefit from a marginal reduction of the reciprocal termination charge, whereas entrant's subscribers benefit or suffer. The incumbent unambiguously suffers from a termination deficit and thus, has an incentive to decrease the number of off-net calls by giving more surplus to its subscribers. The entrant, however, still benefits from interconnection of rival customers, thus on the hand has an incentive to increase the amount of incoming calls. On the other hand, though, it faces higher termination costs for off-net than for on-net calls, thus, it has an incentive to reduce the amount of off-net calls by decreasing the net utility for its customers accordingly.
This translates into a local effect on the entrant's market share of
Hence, the effect on market shares depends on both the demand-and the supply-side asymmetry. For symmetric market shares or symmetric termination cost market shares do not locally respond to a marginal decrease of the reciprocal termination charge below the incumbent's termination cost.
Otherwise, for both a demand-and supply side asymmetry, market shares do locally respond. With price discrimination the surplus from on-net calls remains unaffected by regulation. The marginal effect on surplus is determined by the effects surplus from off-net calls and the adjustment of the fixed fee.
If providers can price discriminate, they can extract every extra surplus by adjusting the fixed fee accordingly. It holds that the marginal effect on net surplus is given by
For symmetric market shares any extra surplus is perfectly passed-through into the fixed fee. Thus, there is no effect on net surplus and accordingly no effect on market shares, independent of any supply-side asymmetry. If market shares differ, the pass-through is imperfect, so also the net surplus of calls is affected. Then, again, the market share effect depends on the extent of the supply-side asymmetry. However, if providers are not able to discriminate in prices, they can not perfectly extract the surplus from on-net and off-net calls, they only extract an average surplus from calls in general and the pass-through into the fixed fee is only partial.
Proposition 9. If providers discriminate between on-net and off-net prices, incumbent's subscribers still benefit from a marginal reduction of the reciprocal termination charge, whereas entrant's subscribers benefit or suffer, depending on the supply-side asymmetry. This translates into a local effect on market shares and profits, thus, both providers may (locally) benefit or suffer from the reduction of the reciprocal termination charge.
Given a supply-side symmetry of c 1 = c 2 providers' profits are locally unaffected by regulation, i.e.
∂Π * i ∂a | a=c 1 = 0, which confirms the result of Carter and Wright (2003) . This directly follows from the neutral market share effect and the fact that on-net and off-net prices are identical for both providers.
Although, if both the demand-and supply-side are asymmetry, the effects on profits are ambiguous again and both providers may benefit or suffer from the reduction which holds independent of a price discrimination between on-net and off-net calls.
Conclusion
This paper has explored the ramification of regulating interconnection terms in asymmetric market environments. Typically, former established networks still enjoy a demand-side advantage over entrants. However, due to later entry, entrants may enjoy a cost-side advantage, because they may have adopted more efficient technologies. The present paper has discussed the effects of two widely proposed regulatory regimes of cost-based and reciprocal regulation.
With cost-based regulation, a low cost network will receive less for rival calls terminated in its network than it has to pay for calls by fellow subscribers terminated in a high cost network. This does not seem to be in line with efforts to encourage market entry of alternative telecommunications providers. Thus it is a relevant policy question, whether to deviate from the cost-based regulation in the presence of cost asymmetries and allow for an access markup on the low cost network. The paper has shown, though, that this even may hinder market entry. The total effect on provider' profits depends on the relative magnitude of a cost-saving and a market share effect.
Otherwise, if providers discriminate between on-net and off-net prices for calls, market entry is unambiguously encouraged.
The European Commission widely favors reciprocal termination charges in the long run, which has been recently been put into practise by the British Ofcom. Hence, in a second step, the paper has analyzed the effects of reciprocity in termination charges. The model shows that incumbent subscribers benefit from a marginal reduction of the reciprocal termination fee, whereas the entrant's subscribers may or benefit or suffer, depending on the degree of substitution of providers and the difference in termination costs. This holds independent of the opportunity to discriminate between on-net and off-net prices. For larger deviations from cost-based regulation the incumbent provider generally suffers from a decrease of the reciprocal termination charge, whereas the entrant generally benefits.
To conclude, a regulatory authority has to consider (positive or negative) feedback effects on market shares and on the demand for calls, when determining the most adequate regulation in the presence of asymmetries in termination costs.
A Appendix Asymmetric Regulation
Proof of Proposition 1:
Profit functions of both providers are given as 
The first order condition of the incumbent provider with respect to subscribers' net surplus ω 1 is given as
For convenience label υ(p i ) = υ i , q(p i ) = q i , and dq(p i ) dp i = q i . Taking account for ∂υi ∂pi = −q i and for per-minute prices of equation (4) it follows that
The cross-derivative is
which around cost-based regulation of termination charges simplifies to
which implies that the incumbent network's pseudo best-response functions is upwards sloping if competition is not too weak and the difference in termination costs (c 1 − c 2 ) is not too large. One obtains that an increase in the entrant's termination charge a 2 shifts the pseudo best-response function outwards, as
which reduces to
This term is strictly positive for s 1 > s 2 and c 2 < c 1 , which has been assumed.
Consider the entrant's profit. Applying same technique, the marginal profit
The cross derivative is denoted as
The shift of the pseudo-best response in the entrant's termination charge is denoted as
As per-minute prices are only affected by rival's termination charges it follows that ∂p * 2 ∂a 2 = 0 and thus
Hence, also the entrant's pseudo best-response is shifted outwards. For identical termination costs, effects of both providers' pseudo best-response function are positive. This confirms the neutrality result on market shares for symmetric termination costs.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The entrant's market share in equilibrium satisfies the equation
The incumbent's market share is accordingly given by s 1 = 1 − s 2 .
Total differentiation of equation (22) ) .
Using
, υ (p i ) = −q i , inserting optimal per-minute prices and rearranging yields that
Price Discrimination
Providers set optimal on-net prices, off-net prices, and the fixed fee by maximizing the profit function with respect to p i ,p i , and ω(p i ,p i ).
and using υ i = −q i follows that
By solving
To derive the optimal fixed fee it is again convenient to consider providers to compete on net-surplus rather than on the fixed fee directly. From evaluation the FOC at equilibrium per-minute prices it follows that
From setting this equal to zero it follows that the optimal net-surplus is 28 given as
After re-substituting F i = s i υ i + s jυi − ω i follows that
Proof of proposition 4:
Along its best-response function each operator sets per-minute prices to the true marginal costs. Thus the only income source stems from subscription and off-net traffic, leading to profits in terms of net surplus of
which implies that the incumbent network's pseudo best-response functions is upwards sloping for any a 2 = c 2 < c 1 . One obtains that an increase in the entrant's termination charge a 2 shifts the pseudo best-response function outwards, since
and hence, the incumbent's subscribers benefit from the entrant's access markup.
The first order condition of the entrant's profit with respect to subscribers' 29 net surplus ω 2 is given as
The cross-derivative is given by
which also implies that the entrant's pseudo best-response functions is upwards sloping. One obtains that an increase in the entrant's termination charge a 2 shifts the pseudo best-response function outwards, since
and thus, also entrant's subscribers benefit from the markup.
Proof of proposition 5:
The equilibrium market share of the incumbent provider is implicitly determined by
and by s 2 = 1 − s 1 for the entrant.
Total differentiation locally around cost-based regulation yields 
Reciprocal Regulation
Proof of Proposition 6:
To show that subscribers benefit from a marginal decrease of the reciprocal termination charge apply the same steps as in the proof of proposition 4.1. Again, from sign(q * 1 − q * 2 )| a=c 1 = (c 2 − c 1 )(2 + s * 2 ) < 0 follows that this is negative and the pseudo best-response function shifts outwards.
Proof of Proposition 7:
The entrant's market share with reciprocal access regulation is given as 1 dp 1 dp * 1 da − dυ * 2 dp 2 dp * 2 da + (a − c 2 )(s * 2 q * 1 + s * 2 q dp * 1 da ) + s * 2 q * 1 − (a − c 1 )(s * 1 q 2 + s * 1 q * 2 ) − s * 1 q * 2 + (c 2 − c 1 )(s * 1 q * 1 + s * 1 q dp * 1 da +s * 2 q * 2 + s * 2 q dp Proof of proposition 8:
The effect on total profits is decomposed in effects in the retail market and in the interconnection market as
Total resulting effects on profits are depicted by evaluating the derivatives of the profit functions with respect to a marginal change in the reciprocal termination charge locally around a = c 1 . Consider the marginal change of
